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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM K. HOWARD, RUTH N. 
HOWARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD, £ 0. AND SHIR·LE·Y L. H·OW ARD, ·~.\ 
Plaintiffs-Responde11i:s, . r· 
. 0. ~~,c. t. 
-vs.- \\ J ~ · '3 ··i. '\ :JU 
i _______ _..--. 
MILDRED M. HOWARD, _ ... -------·.:··c·::~~-~-u\ah 
Defenda;nt-.AppellacJ.fi~.. ·: . ;ram ... 
MILDRED M. HOWARD·, Case No. 
Defendant~and Third Party 
Pla~ntiJff-.App~ellant, No. 9552 
-vs.-
WALKER BANK & TRUST COM-
pANY, as Administrator of the estate 
of L. W. Howard, deceased, WIL-
LIAM K. HOWARD, RUTH N. 
HOWARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD 
and SHIRLEY L. HOWARD, 
Third Party De.fendants-Respondent,s. 
PETITION OF APPELLANT FOR RE-HEARING 
AND BRIEF 
Appeal from Third District c·ourt in and for Salt Lake 
County, HoN. A. H. ELLETT, Judge 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK 
1111 Deseret Bldg. 
Salt Lake ·City 11, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
PERRIS S. JENSEN 
Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondents 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Petition for re-hearing____________________________________________________________________ 1 
Statement of Points__________________________________________________________________________ 2 
Argument: 
Point 1 _____________ ------ __ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ __ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _____ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ ___ _ _ _ __ _____ 3 
Point 2 ____ -------------_ _ _ _ _ _ __ ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ __ _ ___ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ ___ _ _ _ __ ______ _ 4 
Point 3 ________ ----- _____________________ --------- ______________________________ --------------- 5 
Point 4 __ ------------------- _____ --------------- __ __ _ _____ _ _ _____ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __________ _ ______ _ 6 
Point 5 ________ ------ _____________ ----------- _____________ -----------_ _ _ _ _ __ ____ _ _ _ _ _________ 8 
Point 6 _________ -------------------- __________________________ ----------_ --------- __ _ _ _ _ __ _ ____ 10 
CASES CITED 
Losee v. Jones, 120 U. 385, 235 P2d 132---------------------------------------- 8 
Ransberry v. Broadhead, 174 Atl. 97·------------------------------------------- 8 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Patton on Titles, Sec. 7 4, p. 365 .. -------------------------------------------------- 8 
Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed. Vol. 6---------------------------- 5 
Tiffany on Real Property, 3rd Ed., Sec. 977 ____________________________ 12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
vV"Il.JLIA~I K. HOvV ARD, RUTH N. 
HOvV ARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD, 
AND SHIRLEY L. HOWARD, 
Plain tiffs-Respondents, 
-vs.-
MILDRED M. HOWARD, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
~I lLDRED l\L HOWARD, 
Defendant-and Third Party 
P la ~1ntiff -A pp~ellant, 
-vs.-
\VALKER BANK & TRUST COM-
pANY, as Administrator of the estate 
of L. \V-. Howard, deceased, WIL-
LLA.~I K. HOvVARD, RUTH N. 
HO\\r ARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD 
and SHIRLEY L. HO\V ARD, 
Third Party Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 
No. 9552 
PETITION" OF AI:>I>J~I~l.J_.:\XT FOR RE-HEARING 
.A.ND BRIEF 
The defendant and appellant respectfully requests a 
rehearing in the above entitled case upon the following 
grounds: 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT UNDER THE 
FACTS A GRANT IS NOT SUSTAINABLE. 
POINT 2. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT IS EITHER 
IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHAT HOWARD HAD IN 
MIND, OR CONJECTURE INDULGED, ONE WOULD HAVE 
TO DIVINE TH.NT ANY NUMBER OF AREAS COULD BE 
SAID TO HAVE BEEN INTE-NDED. 
POINT 3. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ABSTRACT-
ORS AND LA WYERS SHOULD BE ABLE TO TURN DOWN 
A TITLE BASED ON THE CONTENTIONS OF SUCH AN 
ASSERTED ILLU-SIONARY INTENTION O·F A DECEASED. 
POINT 4. 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE LAST 
STATEMENTS IN THE DESCRIPTION AND IN TREATING 
THE SAME AS CALLS WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE REJECT-
ED THE SAME AS BElNG CUMUL.NTIVE AND NOT A PART 
OF THE DESCRIPTION. 
POINT 5. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROP-
ERTY WHICH APPELLANT CON'TENDS WAS INTENDED 
TO BE DESCRIBED CONTAINS CLOSE TO FIVE ACRES. 
POINT 6. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO REMAND THE 
CASE TO 'THE TRIAL COURT WHERE EXTRINSIC EVI-
DENCE MIGHT BE INTRODUCED TO EXPLAIN THE IN-
TENT OF THE GRANTOR. 
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Al{U lJl\TENT 
POINT 1. 
THE COUR'T ERRED IN HOLDING THAT UNDER THE 
FACTS A GRANT IS NOT SUSTAINABLE. 
It is recognized that the description contained in the 
deed here in question as it no\v stands is not a perfect 
description. This is the reason appellant filed her 
counter-action in this case, for refonnation of the deed. 
There is an obvious omission in the description but the 
deed affords sufficient data to permit the omission to be 
supplied in aid of the description as given. 
The authorities are to the effect that if the descrip-
tion as given sufficiently supplies the means of identify-
ing the land to be conveyed, then it is valid and reforma-
tion is proper. Here the deed in question does just that, 
it supplies the means for identification. In comparing 
the description in the questioned deed as far as it is given, 
\\?ith the original deed by \vhich the grantor acquired 
the tract of \vhich this is a part, the data contained in 
the questioned deed sho\\Ts definitely that the grantor 
intended to ronvey that tract, less tracts A and B, con-
tained '"·ithin the line dra\vn around tracts A and B, and 
excluding tract X. l\f r. Ho\vard states that it is a tract 
including tracts A and B, and then he excepts those two 
tracts. The reference to tracts A and B alone identifies 
the land intended to be conveyed. To hold other\\~ise is 
contrary to that n1le of law announcing that every deed 
ought to be so construed that the intent of the parties 
may prevail and not be defeated. A line running North-
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erly and Southerly cannot be injected into the description 
at any place "':hich runs between tracts A and B, because 
Howard definitely locates the lines around these two 
tracts. But the court says by this decision that it cannot 
tell where Howard intended to locate the property. 
It is difficult to conceive of a deed not complete, more 
definitely supplying the means for identification than in 
this case. Here Mr. Howard definitely locates the tract 
owned by him in the proper quarter section. He ties into 
the proper corner. He definitely locates the beginning 
point, then definitely describes five difficult courses, all 
but the closing one. The furnishing of one line from the 
termini of Howards last call to the place of beginning en-
closes a tract of land owned by the grantor. 
Appellant is entitled to have applied, reasonable 
rules of construction, aided by extrinsic evidence, to 
identify the property. 
POINT 2. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT IS EI'THER 
IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHAT HOWARD HAD IN 
MIND, OR CONJECTURE INDULGED, ONE WOULD HAVE 
TO DIVINE THAT ANY NUMBER OF AREAS COULD BE 
SAID TO HAVE BEEN INTENDED. 
As \Ye have stated under point 1, the description 
as given clearly sho"Ts the intention of the grantor to 
cover that land of \Yhirh the theatre tract "A," and''; ood 
tract, '' B" were a part. Tracts A and B are located in 
opposite corners of the area described, they are included 
in the de~eription and these tracts being excepted it is 
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evident l\lr. lloward intended to convey that land which 
lies between the1n, no other construction is possible. 
The grantor does not say 2.75 acres more or less of a 
tract \vithin the perimeter of that part of the description 
given, the 1neets and bounds description is first given, 
and then it is followed by the words ''containing 2.75 
acres 1nore or less.'' For the court to s.ay the grantor 
might have intended to convey some indefinite 2.75 acres 
of a larger tract, requires the placing of the importance 
of the reference to acreage ahead of the meets and bounds 
description as given, such is not a fair construction of 
the deed. The reference to the acreage is but in aid of 
the description, to show that the grantor intended to 
convey a large tract and not a small one. It cannot be 
said, \vhere the four sides of the property are enclosed by 
a described line or call, that these calls can be ignored and 
the acreage controls, especially when the acreage is fol-
lowed by the words "more or less"; the law is just the 
opposite; where calls are given, they control. See Thomp-
son on Real Property, Perm. Ed., Vol. 6, Sec. 3345 stat-
Ing: 
~·The most n1aterial and particular part of the 
description controls that which is less natural 
and certain. A description by metes and bounds 
controls a statement of the quantity, unless a con-
trary intention appears in the deed." 
POINT 3. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ABSTRACT-
ORS AND LA WYERS SHOULD BE ABLE 'TO TURN DOWN 
A TITLE BASED ON THE CONTENTIONS OF SUCH AN 
ASSERTED ILLUSIONARY INTENTION O·F A DECEASED. 
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It is recognized that abstractors and lawyers in ex-
amining titles accept documents as they appear of record. 
Abstractors compiling an abstract show those documents 
affecting the title as given, and examining attorneys 
rely on the documents as abstracted. Neither are required 
to determine from the documents what the intent of the 
party or parties executing the same was. In order to per-
fect the instrument making up the title, where an omission 
is apparent, and where a grantor such as in this case is 
deceased, the courts are the only ones empowered to 
supply an omission. True abstractors and la-\\ryers may 
turn down titles where imperfect descriptions are con-
tained in instruments making up the title but that does 
not mean the instrument cannot be reformed. Reforma-
tion is the equitable procedure available to those affected 
by discrepancies in deeds. 
This reasoning has no bearing on the question 
whether the deed contains sufficient data to permit the 
omission to be supplied. 
POINT 4. 
'THE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE LAST 
STATEMENTS IN THE DESCRIPTION AND IN TREATING 
THE SAME AS CALLS WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE REJECT-
ED THE SAME AS BEING CUlVIULA'TIVE AND NOT A PART 
OF THE DESCRIPTION. 
As pointed out in appellanfs original brief, Devlin 
states that a deed is not void for uncertainty because 
there may be errors or an inconsistency in some of the 
particulars. If the land conveyed can be identified by 
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the other eal.ls of the dl~scription an impossible or sense-
less course \viii not be considered. Here the land can be 
identified by the five calls of the description. 
rrhis court says in its opinion as rendered: 
H Ho,vard failed to close the fifth and sixth 
courses in the abortive deed, and he tangentially 
de~eribed a course reflected in the dotted line on 
Figure 2, coursing counter-clockwise instead of 
clock\\ri.se and commencing from the real point of 
beginning to the target which he described as a 
point 'from beginning,' \vhich makes no sense." 
As heretofore stated, that part of the description 
\vhich makes no sense expresses nothing more than the 
grantors intention to locate the termni of the fifth call, 
it is not a call nor is it a p~art of the description and it was 
not intended to be. The location of the fifth call is defi-
nite and its length is given, Mr. Howard having particu-
larly described the bearing and distance of the fifth call 
thusly: ""N 46°25' W --t-04 ft more or less,'' this is the 
end of the call of the description, from then on the 
intent \\'"as to locate the termni of the fifth call with refer-
ence to the place of beginning, this added nothing, and 
therefore the use of the words, "from beginning" should 
not be confusing. In fact this part of the deed should not 
be taken into consideration at all under those authorities 
cited by appellant in her brief; without considering the 
above mentioned words, all that is needed to n1ake the 
description complete is to draw a line from the termni 
of the fifth call as given, to the place of beginning, in so 
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doing it \vould enclose a tract of land which evidence will 
show was owned by Mr. Howard at the time he made the 
deed. 
Not only did appellant point out in her brief, the law 
as announced in Devlin on this subject but we also quoted 
from Thompson on Real Property, stating, after an ac-
curate description, an inaccurate description following 
which is merely cumulative \vill be rejected. 
The court says the Losee case cited by appellant is 
complimented by the phrase "'to the place of beginning.'' 
While appellant is mindful of that fact our reason for 
relying on the Losee case as authority is because this 
court therein cited Patton on Titles, Sec. 7 -i, p. 365 stat-
ing the foil owing : 
''even "Then the lines are continuous they 
may fail to enclose any tract owing to failure of 
the final line to return to the starting point." 
The Losee case also cites Ransberry v. Broadhead, 
17 -i Atl. 97 in which case the deed did not recite "to the 
place of beginning." It is presumed fron1 the above state-
ment and cases cited in the Losee case that this court 
'viii not hold any description inoperative simply because 
the last course is not given or that the words '•to the 
place of beginning" are omitted. 
POINT 5. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT T'HE PROP-
ERTY WHICH APPELLANT CONTENDS WAS INTENDED 
ro BE DESCRIBED CONTAINS CLOSE TO FIVE ACRES. 
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.Appellant critcised respondent for injecting into 
their brief statements not in evidence, for this reason ap-
pellant did not think it proper to brief and argue facts 
not in evidence. 
If appellant 'vere afforded the opportunity to intro-
duce extrinsic evidence in this case the evidence would 
show that the property is located on Holladay Boulevard, 
that the description of the tract runs to the centre 
of the street, that the street is a four rod wide street and 
that the frontage along this boulevard runs 6.15 chains, 
causing approximately .3 acre of the prop·erty described 
to be in Holladay Boulevard. That is the reason the 
grantor excepted the roads in his deed. 
Evidence will further show why the grantor intended 
to exclude from the description that tract at the south-
westerly corner, marked by this court as tract X; this 
tract contains in excess of one acre. It is evident from 
the original deed that the whole of the tract acquired 
by the grantor contained but 6.58 acres. 
As stated in point 2, l\Ir. Howard having located all 
but the closing call of the tract by a meets and bounds 
description the reference to acreage is but cumulative 
and descriptive, it is not controlling. It is apparent the 
grantor did not know just what the property contained 
in acreage, his reason for referring to it as 2. 75 acres 
more or less. It is conceded that had the grantor but 
said 2.75 acres more or less of the tract owned by him 
in the N\V~lt of SEll! of Sec. 10, T. 2 S., R. 1 E., "~ithout 
further indentifying the tract, the grant "\Yould be so in-
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definite and uncertain that it would not be possible to 
know what 2.75 acres was intended, but that is not this 
case, here the grantor first used the meets and bounds 
calls of the description, which is controlling. 
POINT 6. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO REMAND THE 
CASE TO 'THE TRIAL CO·URT WHERE EXTRINSIC EVI-
DENCE MIGHT BE INTRODUCED TO EXPLAIN THE IN-
TEN·T OF THE GRANTOR. 
The court in its opinion states: 
"It is significant that after the execution of 
the disputed deed, Ho,vard executed another one 
in favor of 1Irs. Howard, covering an area near 
Tract A, but much smaller, 'vhich deed seems op~er­
ative and accepted as an effective conveyance.'' 
The lower court having granted judg1nent on the 
pleadings, appellant 'vas not afforded the opportunity 
to explain why the deed herein 'Yas given. If the case had 
been tried this could have been explained. Therefore it is 
unfair at this stage of the case to give any significance 
to this act on the part of !ir. Howard. 
It is further evident from the record of the case as it 
no'v stands that appellant, if given the opportunity to 
present her case could produce an engineer 'vho "~ould 
testify that he could locate the property by the descrip-
tion. This court 'vholly overlooks the la'v announced in 
the cases cited by appellant in her brief as to this point. 
Here ,ye have a description sufficient in itself to identify 
the land, and appellant is entitled to introduce extrinsic 
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evidence for the purpose of applying the description to 
the surface of the earth and thus identify it with the tract 
in controversy. The defect in the deed is not a patent de-
fect. There i~ sufficient data included in the deed when 
placed side by side with the deed by which Howard ac-
quired title to the original tract, to show intent, and ap-
pellant is entitled to introduce evidence in aid of the 
description. That evidence must of course, be competent 
evidence and the trial court will require competent evi-
dence. 
vVhile \Ve are mindful of the fact that parol evidence 
is not admissible to enlarge the terms of the writte·n in-
strument or to add to it, still the authorities hold that 
parol evidence is always admissible in aid of application 
of the description to its subject matter. Here as hereto-
fore pointed out, ~Ir. Howard followed difficult courses 
with particularity enclosing a tract of land which he 
owned ; there could be no tract othe.r than that which 
appellant contends was intended to be conveyed; e.vidence 
will show that the tract described is all that Mr. Howard 
had in that area which had not been conveyed, this is 
important to ap·pellant's case. 
Devlin says great liberality is always exercised in 
constructing that part of the deed in which the property 
conveyed is described and the description will be suffi-
cient if it supplies the means for identifying the land 
to be conveyed. 
This Honorable court has in numerous decisions 
where summary judgments have been granted by the 
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lower court, reversed the same and has remanded the case 
to the trial court ; this on the ground that all inferences 
must be resolved in favor of the party against whom the 
judgment is sought. Here appellant has not even been 
afforded the opportunity to submit affidavits, excepting 
that referring to the testimony of an engineer if called, 
to show the intent of the grantor such as a party does 
in a proceeding on a motion for summary judgment, 
neither is appellant favored, by this decision, with these 
inferences. 
The deed here in question furnishes sufficient data 
for appellant to be given the opportunity at a hearing 
to produce evidence to aid the description. Tiffany on 
Real Property cited in our original brief says, the broad 
principles hold that a conveyance will not be declared 
void for insufficiency in its description of the property 
which it purports to convey if it is possible by any reason-
able r11le of constr1~ction, aided by extrinsic evidence, to 
identify the property. (Italics supplied.) 
The case should be remanded to the trial court for 
the taking of evidence in aid of the description to show 
the intent of the grantor. 
Respectfully submitted 
B.A.CKMAN, BACI(~IAN and CLARK, 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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